Rulebooks: Contents

Rulebooks
Mainboard Rules
Definitions and Interpretation
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 Equity Securities
Chapter 3 Debt Securities
Chapter 4 Investment Funds
Chapter 5 Structured Warrants
Chapter 6 Prospectus, Offering Memorandum and Introductory Document
Chapter 7 Continuing Obligations
Chapter 8 Changes in Capital
Chapter 9 Interested Person Transactions
Chapter 10 Acquisitions and Realisations
Chapter 11 Takeovers
Chapter 12 Circulars, Annual Reports and Electronic Communications
Chapter 13 Trading Halt, Suspension and Delisting
Chapter 14 Disciplinary and Appeals Procedures, and Enforcement Powers of the Exchange
Appendices
Practice Notes
Report of the Committee and Code of Corporate Governance
Code of Corporate Governance 2018
Catalist Rules
SGX-ST Rules
CDP Clearing Rules
CDP Settlement Rules
DVP Rules [Entire Rulebook has been deleted]
CDP Depository Rules
Futures Trading Rules
SGX-DC Clearing Rules
SIAC DT Arbitration Rules
SIAC DC Arbitration Rules
Archive
Rule Amendments

  Versions
(1 version)
 
Jan 1 2019 onwards

Practice Guidance 7: Level and Mix of Remuneration

A company's remuneration framework should be tailored to the specific role and circumstances of each director and key management personnel (KMP). This ensures an appropriate remuneration level and mix that recognises the performance, potential and responsibilities of these individuals.

Performance-related remuneration schemes should take account of the risk policies of the company, be symmetric with risk outcomes and be sensitive to the time horizon of risks. There should be appropriate and meaningful measures for the purpose of assessing executive directors' and KMP's performance.

Performance should be measurable, appropriate and meaningful so that they incentivise the right behaviour and values that the company supports. For individuals in control functions (e.g. chief financial officer, chief risk officer, head of the internal audit function), performance measures should be principally based on the achievement of the objectives of their functions. While long-term incentive schemes are generally encouraged for executive directors and KMP, the costs and benefits of such schemes should be carefully evaluated. In normal circumstances, offers of shares or grants of options or other forms of deferred remuneration should vest over a period of time. The use of vesting schedules, whereby only a portion of the benefits can be exercised each year, is strongly encouraged. Executive directors and KMP should be encouraged to hold their shares beyond the vesting period, subject to the need to finance any cost of acquiring the shares and associated tax liability.

The Remuneration Committee should also consider implementing schemes to encourage non-executive directors (NEDs) to hold shares in the company so as to better align the interests of such NEDs with the interests of shareholders. However, NEDs should not be over-compensated to the extent that their independence may be compromised.

Companies should consider the use of contractual provisions to allow them to reclaim incentive components of remuneration from executive directors and KMP in exceptional circumstances, including for example, misstatement of financial results or misconduct resulting in financial loss to the company.