Rulebooks: Contents

Mainboard Rules
Catalist Rules
SGX-ST Rules
Chapter 1 General
Chapter 2 Admission and Registration of Trading Members, Chief Executive Officers and Trading Representatives
Chapter 3 Capital and Financial Requirements
Chapter 4 Operational Requirements
Chapter 5 Trading Practices and Conduct
Chapter 6 Designated Market-Makers
Chapter 7 Listing and Quotation
Chapter 8 Trading
Chapter 9 Settlement
Chapter 10 Requirements on Specific Securities and Futures Contracts
Chapter 11 Cancellation of Contracts and Trades
Chapter 12 Supervision and Enforcement
Chapter 13 Definitions and Interpretation
Regulatory Notices
Practice Notes
Schedule A
CDP Clearing Rules
CDP Settlement Rules
DVP Rules [Entire Rulebook has been deleted]
CDP Depository Rules
Futures Trading Rules
SGX-DC Clearing Rules
SIAC DT Arbitration Rules
SIAC DC Arbitration Rules
Rule Amendments

(1 version)
Jun 3 2019 onwards


The effectiveness of processes to identify suspicious trading behaviour depends to a large extent on the types and size of the parameters set. A list of suggested parameters is below:

(a) To detect orders/trades that are inconsistent with recent trading (not justified by assets, earnings, income yield or prospects) in the security or that would materially alter the market, such as:
(i) orders/trades more than x% or a number of price steps from the previous bid/offer/last traded or closing price;
(ii) several orders usually for small quantities placed close together at increasing or decreasing prices to create 'layering' of buy/sell orders in the market. Such orders may have a material impact on price but could potentially avoid detection by filters designed to pick up large one-time moves in price as the layering of orders results in many small price moves;
(iii) the excessive use of Force Key in entering orders. This may be indicative of a Trading Representative and/or customer or a group of Trading Representatives and/or customers working to move the price far beyond the current price; and/or
(iv) orders entered during pre-opening and pre-close at such a quantity and price that have the effect of creating a false or misleading appearance of the market for, or the price of, such securities.
(b) Orders/trades that result in no change in beneficial ownership of a security or that create a false or misleading appearance of active trading, for example:
(i) orders/trades arising from orders placed on both the buy and sell side of the market at a similar price and time by the same Trading Representative or customer or by a group of Trading Representatives and/or customers acting in concert.

Added on 3 June 2019.