Rulebooks: Contents

Rulebooks
Mainboard Rules
Definitions and Interpretation
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 Equity Securities
Chapter 3 Debt Securities
Chapter 4 Investment Funds
Chapter 5 Structured Warrants
Chapter 6 Prospectus, Offering Memorandum and Introductory Document
Chapter 7 Continuing Obligations
Chapter 8 Changes in Capital
Chapter 9 Interested Person Transactions
Chapter 10 Acquisitions and Realisations
Chapter 11 Takeovers
Chapter 12 Circulars, Annual Reports and Electronic Communications
Chapter 13 Trading Halt, Suspension and Delisting
Chapter 14 Disciplinary and Appeals Procedures, and Enforcement Powers of the Exchange
Appendices
Practice Notes
Report of the Committee and Code of Corporate Governance
Catalist Rules
SGX-ST Rules
CDP Clearing Rules
CDP Settlement Rules
DVP Rules [Entire Rulebook has been deleted]
CDP Depository Rules
Futures Trading Rules
SGX-DC Clearing Rules
SIAC DT Arbitration Rules
SIAC DC Arbitration Rules
Archive
Rule Amendments

  Versions
(3 versions)
 
Up to Dec 31 2004Jan 1 2005 - May 1 2012May 2 2012 onwards

Board Matters

Past version: effective from Jan 1 2005 - May 1 2012.
To view other versions open the versions tab on the right.

THE BOARD'S CONDUCT OF AFFAIRS

Principle:

1 Every company should be headed by an effective Board to lead and control the company. The Board is collectively responsible for the success of the company. The Board works with Management to achieve this and the Management remains accountable to the Board.

Guidelines:

1.1 The Board's role is to:
(a) provide entrepreneurial leadership, set strategic aims, and ensure that the necessary financial and human resources are in place for the company to meet its objectives;
(b) establish a framework of prudent and effective controls which enables risk to be assessed and managed;
(c) review management performance; and
(d) set the company's values and standards, and ensure that obligations to shareholders and others are understood and met.
1.2 All directors must objectively take decisions in the interests of the company.
1.3 If authority to make decisions on certain board matters is delegated by the Board to any Board Committee, such delegation should be disclosed.
1.4 The Board should meet regularly and as warranted by particular circumstances, as deemed appropriate by the board members. Companies are encouraged to amend their Articles of Association to provide for telephonic and videoconference meetings. The number of board and board committee meetings held in the year, as well as the attendance of every board member at these meetings, should be disclosed in the company's annual report.
1.5 Companies should adopt internal guidelines setting forth matters that require board approval, and specify in their corporate governance disclosures the type of material transactions that require board approval under such guidelines.
1.6 Every director should receive appropriate training (including his or her duties as a director and how to discharge those duties) when he is first appointed to the Board. This should include an orientation program to ensure that incoming directors are familiar with the company's business and governance practices. It is equally important that directors should receive further relevant training, particularly on relevant new laws, regulations and changing commercial risks, from time to time.
1.7 Upon appointment of each director, companies should provide a formal letter to the director, setting out the director's duties and obligations.

Commentary:

1.8 The company is encouraged to provide training for first-time directors in areas such as accounting, legal and industry-specific knowledge.

BOARD COMPOSITION AND GUIDANCE

Principle:

2 There should be a strong and independent element on the Board, which is able to exercise objective judgement on corporate affairs independently, in particular, from Management. No individual or small group of individuals should be allowed to dominate the Board's decision making.

Guidelines:

2.1 There should be a strong and independent element on the Board, with independent directors making up at least one-third of the Board. An "independent" director is one who has no relationship with the company, its related companies1 or its officers that could interfere, or be reasonably perceived to interfere, with the exercise of the director's independent business judgement with a view to the best interests of the company. Examples of such relationships, which would deem a director not to be independent, include:
(a) a director being employed by the company or any of its related companies for the current or any of the past three financial years;
(b) a director who has an immediate family member2 who is, or has been in any of the past three financial years, employed by the company or any of its related companies as a senior executive officer whose remuneration is determined by the remuneration committee;
(c) a director, or an immediate family member, accepting any compensation from the company or any of its subsidiaries other than compensation for board service for the current or immediate past financial year; or
(d) a director, or an immediate family member, being a substantial shareholder of or a partner in (with 5% or more stake), or an executive officer of, or a director of any for-profit business organisation to which the company or any of its subsidiaries made, or from which the company or any of its subsidiaries received, significant payments in the current or immediate past financial year. As a guide, payments3 aggregated over any financial year in excess of S$200,000 should generally be deemed significant.
2.2 The relationships set out above are not intended to be exhaustive, and are examples of situations which would deem a director to be not independent. If the company wishes, in spite of the existence of one or more of these relationships, to consider the director as independent, it should disclose in full the nature of the director's relationship and bear responsibility for explaining why he should be considered independent.
2.3 The Board should examine its size and, with a view to determining the impact of the number upon effectiveness, decide on what it considers an appropriate size for the Board, which facilitates effective decision making. The Board should take into account the scope and nature of the operations of the company.
2.4 The Board should comprise directors who as a group provide core competencies such as accounting or finance, business or management experience, industry knowledge, strategic planning experience and customerbased experience or knowledge.
2.5 Non-executive directors should:
(a) constructively challenge and help develop proposals on strategy; and
(b) review the performance of management in meeting agreed goals and objectives and monitor the reporting of performance.

Commentary:

2.6 To facilitate a more effective check on management, non-executive directors are encouraged to meet regularly without management present.

CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Principle:

3 There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the top of the company – the working of the Board and the executive responsibility of the company's business – which will ensure a balance of power and authority, such that no one individual represents a considerable concentration of power.

Guidelines:

3.1 The Chairman and chief executive officer ("CEO") should in principle be separate persons, to ensure an appropriate balance of power, increased accountability and greater capacity of the Board for independent decision making. The division of responsibilities between the Chairman and CEO should be clearly established, set out in writing and agreed by the Board. In addition, companies should disclose the relationship between the Chairman and CEO where they are related to each other (i.e. be of the same immediate family, as defined in footnote 2).
3.2 The Chairman should:
(a) lead the Board to ensure its effectiveness on all aspects of its role and set its agenda;
(b) ensure that the directors receive accurate, timely and clear information;
(c) ensure effective communication with shareholders;
(d) encourage constructive relations between the Board and Management;
(e) facilitate the effective contribution of non-executive directors in particular;
(f) encourage constructive relations between executive directors and nonexecutive directors; and
(g) promote high standards of corporate governance.
The responsibilities set out above provide guidance and should not be taken as a comprehensive list of all the duties and responsibilities of a Chairman.

Commentary:

3.3 Companies may appoint an independent non-executive director to be the lead independent director where the Chairman and the CEO is the same person, where the Chairman and the CEO are related by close family ties, or where the Chairman and the CEO are both part of the executive management team. The lead independent director (if appointed) should be available to shareholders where they have concerns which contact through the normal channels of the Chairman, CEO or Finance Director has failed to resolve or for which such contact is inappropriate.

BOARD MEMBERSHIP

Principle:

4 There should be a formal and transparent process for the appointment of new directors to the Board.

Guidelines:

4.1 Companies should establish a Nominating Committee ("NC") to make recommendations to the Board on all board appointments. The NC should comprise at least three directors, a majority of whom, including the Chairman, should be independent. In addition, the NC Chairman should be a director who is not, or who is not directly associated with4, a substantial shareholder (with interest of 5% or more in the voting shares of the company). Its membership should be disclosed in the annual report. The NC should have written terms of reference that describe the responsibilities of its members.
4.2 The NC should be charged with the responsibility of re-nomination having regard to the director's contribution and performance (e.g. attendance, preparedness, participation and candour) including, if applicable, as an independent director. All directors should be required to submit themselves for re-nomination and re-election at regular intervals and at least every three years.
4.3 The NC is charged with the responsibility of determining annually if a director is independent, bearing in mind the circumstances set forth in Guideline 2.1 and any other salient factors. If the NC determines that a director who has one or more of the relationships mentioned therein can be considered independent, the company should make such disclosure as stated in Guideline 2.2. Conversely, the NC has the discretion to determine that a director is nonindependent even if he does not fall under the circumstances set forth in Guideline 2.1.
4.4 When a director has multiple board representations, he or she must ensure that sufficient time and attention is given to the affairs of each company. The NC should decide if a director is able to and has been adequately carrying out his/her duties as a director of the company. Internal guidelines should be adopted that address the competing time commitments that are faced when directors serve on multiple boards.
4.5 A description of the process for the selection and appointment of new directors to the Board should be disclosed. This should include disclosure on the search and nomination process.
4.6 Key information regarding directors, such as academic and professional qualifications, shareholding in the company and its subsidiaries, board committees served on (as a member or Chairman), date of first appointment as a director, date of last re-election as a director, directorships or chairmanships both present and those held over the preceding three years in other listed companies and other major appointments, should be disclosed in the annual report. In addition, the company's annual disclosure on corporate governance should indicate which directors are executive, non-executive or considered by the NC to be independent. The names of the directors submitted for election or re-election should also be accompanied by such details and information to enable shareholders to make informed decisions.

BOARD PERFORMANCE

Principle:

5 There should be a formal assessment of the effectiveness of the Board as a whole and the contribution by each director to the effectiveness of the Board.

Guidelines:

5.1 Every Board should implement a process to be carried out by the NC for assessing the effectiveness of the Board as a whole and for assessing the contribution by each individual director to the effectiveness of the Board. This assessment process should be disclosed in the annual report.
5.2 The NC should decide how the Board's performance may be evaluated and propose objective performance criteria. Such performance criteria, which allow for comparison with industry peers, should be approved by the Board and address how the Board has enhanced long term shareholders' value. These performance criteria should not be changed from year to year, and where circumstances deem it necessary for any of the criteria to be changed, the onus should be on the Board to justify this decision.
5.3 In addition to any relevant performance criteria which the Board may propose, the performance evaluation should also consider the company's share price performance over a five-year period vis-à-vis the Singapore Straits Times Index and a benchmark index of its industry peers.
5.4 Individual evaluation should aim to assess whether each director continues to contribute effectively and demonstrate commitment to the role (including commitment of time for board and committee meetings, and any other duties). The Chairman should act on the results of the performance evaluation, and where appropriate, propose new members be appointed to the Board or seek the resignation of directors, in consultation with the NC.

Commentary:

5.5 Other performance criteria that may be used include return on assets ("ROA"), return on equity ("ROE"), return on investment ("ROI") and economic value added ("EVA") over a longer-term period.

ACCESS TO INFORMATION

Principle:

6 In order to fulfil their responsibilities, Board members should be provided with complete, adequate and timely information prior to board meetings and on an on-going basis.

Guidelines:

6.1 Management has an obligation to supply the Board with complete, adequate information in a timely manner. Relying purely on what is volunteered by Management is unlikely to be enough in all circumstances and further enquiries may be required if the particular director is to fulfil his or her duties properly. Hence, the Board should have separate and independent access to the company's senior management.
6.2 Information provided should include background or explanatory information relating to matters to be brought before the Board, copies of disclosure documents, budgets, forecasts and monthly internal financial statements. In respect of budgets, any material variance between the projections and actual results should also be disclosed and explained.
6.3 Directors should have separate and independent access to the company secretary. The role of the company secretary should be clearly defined and should include responsibility for ensuring that board procedures are followed and that applicable rules and regulations are complied with. Under the direction of the Chairman, the company secretary's responsibilities include ensuring good information flows within the Board and its committees and between senior management and non-executive directors, as well as facilitating orientation and assisting with professional development as required. The company secretary should attend all board meetings.
6.4 The appointment and the removal of the company secretary should be a matter for the Board as a whole.
6.5 The Board should have a procedure for directors, either individually or as a group, in the furtherance of their duties, to take independent professional advice, if necessary, at the company's expense.

1 A related company in relation to a company includes its subsidiary, fellow subsidiary, or parent company.

2 As defined in the Listing Manual of the Singapore Exchange to mean the spouse, child, adopted child, stepchild, brother, sister and parent.

3 Payments for transactions involving standard services with published rates or routine and retail transactions and relationships (for instance credit card or bank or brokerage or mortgage or insurance accounts or transactions) will not be taken into account, unless special or favourable treatment is accorded.

4 A director will be considered "directly associated" to a substantial shareholder when the director is accustomed or under an obligation, whether formal or informal, to act in accordance with the directions, instructions or wishes of the substantial shareholder.